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This paper concerns justice of war.​[1]​ However, we will concentrate only on the issue of what can be just causes of war, instead of evaluating the entire justification of war. In other words, we will limit our discussion to the question concerning just cause and leave aside more general questions concerning justness and moral permissibility of war. Obviously, a war can be unjust and morally questionable even if it has a just cause. For instance, a war that involves unnecessary use of power is unjust, at least according to the traditional just war theory, even if it had a just cause.​[2]​

The topic here is so-called environmental wars, and especially the question: would a country that suffers from huge environmental problems caused by another country have a just cause for a defensive war? Danish philosopher Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that under certain conditions extreme poverty may give a just cause for a country to defensive war, if that poverty is caused by other countries.​[3]​ So, why could not victims of environmental problems have a similar right to self-defense, given that victims of extreme poverty could have such right?

Suppose that a country unjustly attacks another country by means of biological weapons. In that case, people would probably say that the country that has been attacked has a just cause for a defensive war. Similarly, if a country or a group of countries unjustly attacks another country or a group of countries by means of environmental weapons – by intentionally causing environmental catastrophe – it is likely that most people would say that the countries that have been attacked have a just cause for a defensive war.​[4]​

Suppose, however, that a group of countries causes huge environmental problems with hundreds of casualties to a group of countries unintentionally, as a side effect of the aim of industrial and economic growth. Would the countries that suffer the consequences of such aim have a just cause for a defensive war in that case? 

Most of us tend to think that they would not have a just cause for a defensive war – after all, they would not be under military attack. But the issue is not entirely clear. Why would not the countries have a just cause for a defensive war if the consequences of other countries’ actions were exactly the same as the consequences that would occur if the other countries used ”environmental weapons”? The question is certainly sensible, although it is theoretical.

In what follows, we will very briefly analyze this problem and list the questions that must be made and settled if defensive war in the case of serious environmental damages is said to have (or not to have) a just cause. We are mainly interested in the right questions, and assume that you can provide plausible answers only if you have first defined right questions.

2. The Question of Liability

It is often accepted that a country has a just cause for using military force only if the target country is liable to be warred upon and there is a sufficient reason to use military force. What kinds of reasons are “sufficient” is certainly a complicated question, but the question of liability is often even harder. When a target country is liable to be warred upon? What should a “country” do in order to make itself liable to military action? To say that a country is liable does not necessarily mean that it deserves to be attacked. Indeed, some people like American philosopher Jeff McMahan argues that an agent can be liable even if it is not culpable, i.e., even if it has not done anything bad intentionally.​[5]​ (Notice also that a country can be liable to something else than to be warred upon, say, to diplomatic sanctions.)

Possibly, an agent can be morally responsible simply because the agent takes seemingly innocent risks. A person who does not carefully check the condition of the roof of his house because the roof seems to be in a very good shape, may be, in some sense, morally responsible, if a stone drops from the roof and someone dies. If so, then moral responsibility does not require very much. 

Suppose now that minimal moral responsibility is sufficient for liability. If this interpretation of the concept of liability is accepted, then it can be argued that countries that cause huge environmental problems for other countries could be liable to be warred upon – even if those countries harm other countries without any bad intentions or without being somehow negligent.​[6]​

3. The Question of Collective Responsibility

When people say that a “country” is liable, whose liability it is that makes the country liable? Whose actions count as country’s actions? There are several options: citizens, solders, politicians, government, business leaders, individual stake holders, and so on. A related question is what they, say business leaders, should do in order to be culpable or morally responsible so that their actions create liability. It would certainly be a very strange to argue that merely owning a business company that pollutes other countries creates so serious responsibility that it makes the country in which the company acts liable to be warred upon. A separate problem is that it is often very hard to say who owns this and that company. They are owned by investment fund enterprises that have hundreds or even thousands of owners, and those companies act in the international markets.

If a country is ever liable to be warred upon because it unintentionally causes huge environmental problems to another country, then it is likely that the state (i.e. the government) should be somehow involved in the harmful action. Would it make sense to say that merely allowing harmful industry is sufficient to cause moral responsibility and also liability? Perhaps, but the issue is not clear. The government should certainly know that there is a great chance that their industry may cause problems in other countries. After all, it is commonly known that environmental problems do not respect state boundaries. On the other hand, however, how could the government’s permissive action make the whole country, including individual citizens, liable to military action? That would be a strange implication again. If the government is democratic, then “individual citizens” as voters undoubtedly are involved in the government’s decisions. Also, the citizens of rich and polluting countries benefit from the permissive decisions of their governments. But is that enough to the conclusion that the whole country is liable to be warred upon?​[7]​

4. The Question of the Scale of Damage and Number of Casualties





We have argued that it is important to study whether so-called environmental wars could have a just cause. By environmental wars we have referred to wars that are started in order to prevent or stop serious environmental damages caused by another country or countries. We would like to stress that the topic of this paper has not been the question whether such environmental wars would have an overall moral justification. It is usually quite clear that such wars would be completely unacceptable: they would cause terrible amount of suffering and casualties; they would not have much chances of success; they would probably spoil environment even more; they would not be the last resort to solve the relevant problems; and so on.

We pointed out that there are three questions that are most important in this context. They are the question concerning liability, the question of collective responsibility, and the question whether environmental harms may create a “sufficient reason” for raising a war (and exactly when it may if it may).

An interesting question is whether the traditional just war theory is the best tool to evaluate the moral acceptability of violence caused by serious environmental damages. Arguably, the conflicting parties in environmental conflicts are not likely to be states but smaller communities. This raises questions concerning the justification of civil disobedience and its limits and means. It also raises ethical questions about “justified terrorism”, a concept that some people find inherently inconsistent.​[8]​ Furthermore, issues of the rights of minority groups come relevant, since the victims of environmental hazards are often communities with a specific ethnic background. It seems clear that the international community should adopt policies that secure the rights of those groups against the actions of multinational corporations who are supported by national governments and cause considerable harm to ethnic minority groups.​[9]​ “Environmental racism” – as the phenomenon is often called – should be stopped.
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